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A model is presented in which spot and contract market exchange co-exist. A contract consists of a 
delivery requirement between an upstream and a downstream party. Contract formation determines to 
a certain extent the probability distribution of the spot market price. This contract formation 
externality entails the removal of high reservation price buyers and various sellers from the spot 
market. The first effect decreases the expected spot market price when the number of contracts is 
small, whereas the decrease in the number of sellers and additional residual contract demand increase 
the expected spot market price beyond a certain number of contracts. It implies an endogenous upper 
bound on the number of contracts. Contract prices are positively related to the number of contracts. 
Finally, additional contracts reduce the variance of the spot market price when the number of 
contracts is sufficiently large. 
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Many industries consist of enterprises using different forms of exchange. First, many markets are 
characterized by the co-existence of spot and contract markets. Menard and Klein (2004, p752) report 
that ‘In France, over 80% of the growers in the poultry industry operated under contracts in 1994. In the 
U.S. pork industry, about 72% of total hogs were sold through marketing contracts in 2001.’ This 
phenomenon is not limited to agricultural markets. Electricity markets are an example (Newbery, 1998). 
Second, partial vertical integration regarding internal shipments to manufacturing establishments is a 
widespread phenomenon. McDonald (1985) reports that it varies from 10% in industries like tabacco, 
furniture and leather to more than 50% in the transportation equipment and petroleum refining 
industries. Finally, the coexistence of investor owned firms and producer cooperatives can be found in 
agricultural markets throughout the world (Hendrikse, 1998 and Sexton and Lavoie, 2001). 
The empirical significance of the co-existence of exchange forms is not reflected in the theoretical 
literature. One of the main problems of the models is the stark predictions they generate. Either all 
exchange via contracts in the industry or no contracting at all is privately optimal. There are a few 
exceptions. Perry (1978) obtains co-existence in equilibrium by having a dominant manufacturer 
adopting a policy of price discrimination. This firm contracts with the stages having more elastic derived 
demands in order to be able to charge the remaining stages higher prices. Carlton (1979a) models the 
assurance of supply argument. Contracts arise from a desire to avoid input rationing and it transfers risk 
from one sector of the economy to another. Firms contract partially in equilibrium in order to assure a 
sufficient probability of sale. Hendrikse and Peters (1989) establish co-existence in a world 
characterized by rationing, differences in the reservation prices of buyers, and differences in the risk 
attitudes of buyers and seller. Carlton (1979b) assumes that the cost of transacting in the spot market are 
higher than those internally because there is a cost due to the variability of spot market exchange besides 
the fixed and variable production cost. Contract exchange doesn't incur these variability cost. 
Uncertainty and transaction cost create incentives for firms to use both markets for the sale of their 
output. The short-run equilibrium is attained when both the spot and contract market clear. These 
markets equilibrate when firms are indifferent at the margin between supplying on the spot and contract 
market. Products exchanged via contracts sell at a lower price than those exchanged via the spot market 
because the marginal cost of satisfying contract demand is lower than the marginal cost of satisfying 
spot demand. The comparative statics show that if the spot market variability increases, then the 
expected spot market price increases and the contract price decreases. Bolton and Whinston (1993) 
consider the choice of governance structure in a setting with one seller and two buyers; and uncertainty 
about the ability of the seller to deliver. The main focus is on supply assurance concerns when several  
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downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply. Our model has many sellers and buyers, 
focusing on the relationship between the spot and contract market. Finally, Xia and Sexton (2004) look 
at the (anti) competitive implications of contract pricing clauses in a duopsony model. This article 
addresses the impact of a contractual delivery requirement on the coexistence of spot and contract 
markets. 
Perry (1989) distinguishes three broad determinants of contracting: technological economies, 
transactional economies and market imperfections. Market imperfections entail both imperfect 
competition and imperfect or asymmetric information. Our model treats transactional economies and 
market imperfections, with an emphasis on the latter in the form of imperfect competition. More 
specifically, the interdependence between spot and contract market exchange will be examined with a 
model in which the market is characterized by asymmetric buyers, stochastic supply and costs associated 
with spot market trade. Each buyer is characterized by a different reservation price and always wants to 
buy one unit. Sellers are assumed to be identical and have a unit for sale only with a certain probability. 
Buyers and sellers have to decide whether to exchange products via contracts or in the spot market. This 
analysis of endogenous contract formation and endogenous uncertainty establishes results about the size 
of the spot market and which firms are in the spot market. 
A contract consists of a delivery requirement and a contract benefit parameter. Both features are 
exogenous in our model in order to focus on the impact of (real-world) contracts on market structure. 
First, delivery requirements are a common feature of contracts between buyers and sellers. Nilsson 
(1998, p42) writes regarding agricultural cooperatives ‘The delivery obligation for members is the 
dominating practice everywhere; in some countries it is even an obligation bylaw.’ Cook and Tong 
(1997) identify as one of the main organizational characteristics of New Generation Cooperatives that 
that each member has members have the right, but also the obligation, to deliver a specific quantity of 
the commodity each season. If the quantity delivered is lower than initially agreed in the delivery right, 
the cooperative has the right to buy the commodity on the producer’s behalf and charge them for the 
difference in price. Cook and Iliopoulos (1999, p526) cite a cooperative expert saying ‘Farmers are 
required to deliver according to plan regardless of the open market.’ 
Second, exchange via a contract faces different cost than exchange in the spot market. A contract 
is an institutional arrangement by which some of the spot market exchange costs can be reduced, but 
other costs emerge. Contract exchange requires resources in order to establish and police incentive 
systems for good performance, to coordinate, and to plan. However, buying and selling in external 
markets requires also resources. For example, Carlton (1979b) argues that some benefits are not 
captured when exchange is done in the spot market (‘real costs are associated with operating in a 
variable market’) because search costs are involved in establishing a match between a buyer and a seller.  
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The focus of transaction cost economics is on the different costs associated with different governance 
structures (Williamson, 1986). Each mode of exchange has different coordination and incentive 
problems. This article will not specify a new model with respect to these differences, but take them for 
granted and summarize them by a parameter. It reflects the net benefit associated with contract exchange 
compared to spot market exchange. This reduced form specification is chosen, like in Riordan and 
Williamson (1985), in order to focus on the market effects of contracts. Empirical research has to 
determine the value of this parameter based on a model capturing more fundamental, structural 
technological, coordination and incentive features, like in Crocker and Reynolds (1993). 
Contract formation determines to a certain extent the probability distribution of the spot market 
price in our model. This contract formation externality entails the removal of high reservation price 
buyers and various sellers from the spot market. The first effect decreases the expected spot market price 
when the number of contracts is small, whereas the decrease in the number of sellers and additional 
residual contract demand increase the expected spot market price beyond a certain number of contracts. 
Contract prices are positively related to the number of contracts. Finally, additional contracts reduce the 
variance of the spot market price when the number of contracts is sufficiently large. 
The model entails an endogenous upper bound on the number of contracts. The extent of 
contracting is disciplined by the opportunities provided by the spot market to each buyer and seller. It 
determines which buyers and sellers will be in contracts as well as the distribution of benefits. The 
buyers with the high reservation prices will be in contracts because they are able to compensate the 
seller for not being in the spot market. The spot market provides these buyers with an extra opportunity 
to satisfy their unfulfilled demand. Not all firms can afford a contract. Buyers with a low reservation 
price are not able to compensate sellers for not being in the spot market when spot market demand is 
high. The role of these buyers is to support the existence of the spot market. These buyers are able to 
survive because it is sufficient for them to get at least once in a while the product. Sellers in the spot 
market earn the same profits as their counterparts in the contracting mode of exchange because they 
have the opportunity of making an exchange with a high reservation price buyer, once in a while. 
The extent of contracting is disciplined by the opportunities provided by the spot market to each 
buyer and seller. It determines which buyers and sellers will be in contracts as well as the distribution of 
benefits. The buyers with the high reservation prices will be in contracts because they are able to 
compensate the seller for not being in the spot market. The spot market provides these buyers with an 
extra opportunity to satisfy their unfulfilled demand. Not all firms can afford a contract. Buyers with a 
low reservation price are not able to compensate sellers for not being in the spot market when spot 
market demand is high. The role of these buyers is to support the existence of the spot market. These 
buyers are able to survive because it is sufficient for them to get at least once in a while the product.  
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Sellers in the spot market earn the same profits as their counterparts in the vertical integration mode of 
exchange because they have the opportunity of making an exchange with a high reservation price buyer, 
once in a while. 
The comparative statics analysis with respect to the effect of a change in the benefit of contracting 
on the expected spot market price depends on three economic forces: the change in the spot market 
supply, the change in the composition of buyers not vertically integrated and the change in residual 
contract demand in the spot market. The endogeneity of the probability distribution of the spot market 
price is responsible for these forces. A change in the extent of contracting will alter the composition of 
buyers and sellers in the spot market and therefore the distribution of the spot market price. It is shown 
that a switch from no contracting to some contracting will decrease the expected spot market price. The 
reduction in spot market demand due to contracting (second effect) dominates the reduction in supply 
effect (first effect), because the high reservation price buyers are less often active in the spot market. An 
increase in the contract benefit at larger values of the contract benefit parameter will increase the 
expected spot market price. Albeit high reservation price buyers will switch to the contracting mode of 
exchange, they will still sometimes be in the spot market when the contract partner is not able to deliver 
a unit of the product (third effect). This demand effect dominates the reduction in spot market supply 
effect beyond a certain level of the contract benefit parameter. This result establishes that there is an 
endogenous upperbound on the number of contracts that can be formed. The decision to contract 
changes the composition of agents in the spot market and therefore the probability distribution of the 
spot market price. This external effect limits the use of vertical integration as the primary mode of 
exchange. 
The variance of the spot market price exhibits a similar pattern, except for high values of the 
contract benefit parameter. An increase in the costs of spot market exchange takes a high reservation 
price buyer out of the spot market, given that the costs of spot market exchange are small. The 
remaining buyers in the spot market are more similar, which reduces the variance of the spot market 
price. Additional contracting reduces the differences between the buyers in the spot market even further, 
but it increases the variety in the residual contract demand. This second effect dominates for 
intermediate values of the contract benefit parameter and therefore increases the variance of the spot 
market price. Finally, a further increase in the contract benefit parameter will reduce the variance when 
almost all exchange goes via contracts. Spot market supply is at such a low level that only the high 
reservation price buyers are able to get a unit (at a high price) in the spot market when their contract 
partner is not delivering.  
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The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section three states and proves 
the results. The comparative statics results are formulated in section four. Section five formulates 




The coexistence of spot and contract markets is analysed with a model consisting of σ sellers and 
β buyers. Denote the set of sellers by S = {1,...σ} and the set of buyers by B = {1,...,β}. All sellers are 
assumed to be identical. Two possible states are distinguished for each seller i, i ∈ S. Seller i has either 
one unit for sale or nothing at all. The probability that seller i does not have a unit for sale is µ. Define a 
σ-dimensional vector e such that ei = 0 when seller i does not have a unit for sale and ei = 1 otherwise. 
Define Rj as the reservation price of buyer j for the product, and assume that R1 > R2 > ... > Rβ. Only one 
state is considered for each buyer j, i.e. buyer j always wants to buy one unit. (Notice that with this 
specification no assumption is made with respect to the slope of the demand function.) Figure 1 presents 












Figure 1: Sellers and buyers 
 
A market structure M is a partition of the set of buyers and sellers. The set of buyers and sellers in 
contracts is defined to be CM. The alternative to a contract is to be in the spot market. The spot market 
price p(M,e) is defined to clear the market, i.e. the spot market price allocates the available goods in the 
spot market to the buyers with the highest reservation price. The level of the market clearing price may 
be anywhere between the reservation price of the marginal buyer and the highest reservation price of the 
buyers who don't get a unit. Price formation in markets is the result of a bargaining process, where the 
price rule p(M,e) summarizes the distribution of bargaining power in the spot market. Vincent (1992) 
illustrates with a number of simple many-person bargaining games that many subtleties are involved in 
the modelling of competitive forces in a strategic setting. The equilibrium price turns out to be quite 
sensitive with respect to the model being adopted and the equilibrium concept that is used. However, the 
most demanding equilibrium requirements point towards the buyers having all the bargaining power in 
1-µ  Sellers                                                                           ………………………….
Buyers                                                                     …………………………….. 
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our model. We assume therefore that the spot market price p(M,e) is equal to the reservation price of the 
buyer with the highest reservation price among the buyers who don't get a unit of the product. If supply 
is equal to, or larger than, demand, then the spot market price is equal to zero. 
A contract between a buyer and a seller is a binding agreement, i.e. each party abides the rules of 
the contract. Contracts are only allowed between one buyer and one seller. This captures the belief that 
there are limits to the extent of contracting. The assumption of efficient rationing (Tirole, 1988) is used 
to break ties in situations where the demand for contracts exceeds supply. The contract has to address all 
possible states of the economic environment. We adopt the following rules for a contract between seller 
i and buyer j: 
  -  if seller i has a unit for sale, then this unit has to be delivered to buyer j; 
  -  buyer j receives a contract benefit α when seller i delivers the unit 
  - if seller i does not have a unit for sale, then buyer j will try to buy a unit from another 
  seller not in a contract 
  -  seller i receives a contract price ci, regardless of the ex-post realization of e.
1 
The vector of contract prices is defined to be c. 
The contract benefit is defined to be α. The exogenous parameter α summarizes the difference 
between a contract and the spot market mode of exchange to deal with coordination and incentive 
problems. Higher values of α imply that contract exchange becomes more attractive than spot market 
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Define the one-to-one correspondence  , : B C S C M M M I I → ϕ  i.e. each seller in a contract is 
assigned a particular buyer. Denote the expected payoff of buyer j in market structure M as: 
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1 This contract rule implies that payments are not contingent on the state. This seems to be a natural way 
of modelling vertical integration when we think of it as the buyer making a bid for the seller. However, 
contract rules could be easily changed into state contingent payments. For example, the payment ci could 
be made contingent on the seller having a unit for sale simply by multiplying by 1/(1-µ). Although this 
scheme is harder to accept than the interpretation used here, it does not change the qualitative nature of 
our results. Notice that the specification is not at all close to a complete contingent contract. Bajari and 




The sequence of decisions is as follows. All sellers are assumed to choose simultaneously a 
contract price in a non-cooperative way. Subsequently, buyers decide simultaneously which contract to 
accept (or to be in the spot market), given the vector of contract prices c. Third, nature chooses for each 
seller independently the value of ei. Finally, trade takes place and the spot market price is determined to 
clear the market. An outcome (c,M) is defined to be an equilibrium when it is a Nash equilibrium of the 




The equilibrium features of the model will be derived in this section. Theorem 1 establishes that 
the buyers with the high reservation prices are in contracts. 
 
Theorem 1:  Suppose Rj > Rj+1. If buyer j+1 is in a contract in equilibrium, then buyer j is as 
well. 
 
Proof: Suppose contrary to the proposition that there exists an equilibrium market structure M in which 
buyer j+1 is in a contract and buyer j is not. Denote by M′ and alternative market structure that differs 
from M only by the fact that buyer j+1 is not in a contract. By assumption of a Nash equilibrium M ≥j+1 
M′, i.e. market structure M is weakly preferred to market structure M′ by buyer j+1. Also define market 
structure M" as the market structure that differs from M only by the fact that buyer j is in a contract and 
buyer j+1 is not. By assumption of a Nash equilibrium in the acceptance game M ≥j M". The efficient 
rationing assumption entails that buyer j can always decide to replace buyer j+1. This will be done 
because buyer j strictly prefers M" above M, when buyer j+1 weakly prefers M above M′. This is a 
contradiction and implies that M can not be an equilibrium. The conclusion is therefore that a contract is 
attractive for buyer j when it is attractive for buyer j+1. 
 
Theorem 2 establishes that the equilibrium contract prices are identical and equal to the 
equilibrium payoff of a seller in the spot market. 
 
Theorem 2:  If (c,M) is an equilibrium, then ci = sl(M), where i, l ∈ S, i ∈ CM and l ∉ CM. 
 
Proof: Assume that the set CM of equilibrium outcome (c,M) consists of k buyers and k sellers. Theorem 
1 has shown that the buyers with R1,...,Rk will be in CM. Define the ranking of contract prices of the  
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sellers such that c(1) ≤ c(2) ≤...≤ c(σ). Observe that ci < sl(M) can not be part of an equilibrium outcome, 
because a contract price sl(M) is strictly preferred by seller i. A contract  price ci > sl(M) can also not be 
part of an equilibrium outcome, because an offer sl = sl(M) +  (ci-sl(M))/2 strictly improves the expected 
payoff of seller j and upsets (c,M) as an equilibrium outcome. The proof is completed by observing that 
no player can strictly improve his expected payoff by changing his contract price or mode of exchange 
when ci = sl(M). 
 
Define α(k) as the minimum value α for which adopting the k-th contract is advantageous for 
buyer Rk, given that the k-1 buyers with the highest reservation prices are in contracts. 
 
  Lemma: 0 = α(1) = α(2) < α(3) < ... < α(N). 
 
The intuition is provided here, while the formal proof of this lemma is in the appendix. If there are no 
contracts, then the move to the contract mode of exchange by buyer R1 doesn't change the distribution of 
prices which have to be paid by this buyer. Buyer R1 acquires the product at the prevailing price in the 
market, or has to compensate its contract partner for not being in the spot market. The expected cost of 
buyer R1 of acquiring a unit is the same for both modes of exchange when there is only one contract. 
However, the contract generates an additional benefit α for buyer R1 when the contract partner delivers. 
The value of α at which vertical integration is at least as attractive as spot market exchange is therefore 
zero. A similar argument applies to α(2). If there are two or more units produced by the sellers, then the 
distribution of prices is unaffected by the formation of the second contract. The only possibility for the 
value of α(2) to be different from α(1) is therefore the situation in which only one unit is available in the 
market. Buyer R2 will not obtain this unit when it is either produced by the contract partner of buyer R1 
or by one of the sellers in the spot market. If the contract partner of R2 is the only one producing, then it 
will be delivered in this contract. However, the contract partner has to be compensated for not being in 
the spot market, i.e. R2 has to be paid. The surplus associated with this possibility for R2 is therefore 
zero. The contract benefit α has to be larger than zero in order to have a third contract. The reason is that 
buyer R3 may receive a unit when either buyer R1 or R2 would have received it at spot market price R2 
and R3 respectively, without this third contract. Prices R2 and R3 will occur less frequently in the spot 
market, because the contract partner of buyer R3 has to be compensated for these opportunities. It does 
not matter for the expected payoff of buyer R3 when spot market price R3 would have occurred, but it 
does for buyer R2. This results in a positive value α(3). The other inequalities in the lemma are 
explained in the same way. 




Theorem 3:  If α(k) ≤  α < α(k+1), then the unique equilibrium market structure consists of k 
contracts, involving the k buyers with the highest reservation prices. 
This result follows immediately from theorem 1, 2 and the definition of α(k). It shows that the 
coexistence of the spot and contract market is driven by some kind of market failure (, i.e. α) in our 
model. There are no contracts when α < 0. The difference α - α(j) reflects the reservation price of buyer 
j for having a contract, i.e. α - α(j) is the demand curve for contracts. The supply curve of contracts is 
perfectly elastic in our set-up because there are no costs involved in starting or carrying out contract 
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                          # vertical integration 
Figuur 2: The contract market 
 
Notice that the above result is independent of the reservation prices of the buyers. It is robust with 
respect to any demand schedule. The spot market enables the high reservation price buyers with an 
additional opportunity to satisfy their unfulfilled demand. The role of the low reservation price buyers is 
to support the existence of the spot market. These buyers are not able to compensate the remaining 
sellers in the spot market for giving up the option of supplying high reservation value buyers in states of 
low overall supply. However, they survive because it is sufficient for them to get the product at least 
once in a while. Sellers in the spot market earn the same profits as their counterparts in contracts 
because they have the opportunity of making an exchange with a high reservation price buyer, once in a 
while. Notice that our model has uncertainty on the supply side and differences between buyers. This is 
qualitatively equivalent to differences between sellers and uncertainty on the demand side.  
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We have taken the number of sellers to be equal to the number of buyers. This is a short run 
situation. Suppose that the number of buyers is also fixed in the long run, but that the number of sellers 
is determined by market conditions. There are three kinds of sellers in the long run. First, sellers in 
contracts having positive average output. Second, sellers without contract having positive average 
output. Finally, sellers having zero average output and in the spot market (potential entrants). Buyers can 
contract with any seller who has not already done so.  Suppose that sellers have to pay a fee each period 
in order to participate in this market. The expected spot market price will be equal to this fee in the long-
run equilibrium, because the zero profit condition of entrants determines the expected spot market price. 
Entry has a negative effect on the expected payoff of a seller. This will limit the extent of entry. A 
decrease in the expected payoff of sellers will increase the number of contracts because more buyers are 
now able to afford a contract. The formation of additional contracts increases the expected payoff of a 
seller and will (partially) offset the decrease in the expected payoff due to entry. This will limit entry 
less. 
 
4 COMPARATIVE STATICS 
 
This section will show the relationship between the number of contracts, the expected payoff of a 
seller in the spot market, the expected spot market price and the variance of the spot market price. We 
also show numerical comparative statics results with respect to the probability of having a unit for sale. 
 
Theorem 4:  The equilibrium expected payoff of a seller in the spot market as a function of 
the extent of contracting k is constant when k  ∈ {0,1,2} and increases 
otherwise. 
 
A matrix S(k) is constructed in the appendix. It characterizes the probability distribution of the spot 
market price as a function of the extent of contracting k from the viewpoint of a seller in the spot 
market, given that this seller is producing and the k buyers with the highest reservation prices have 
contracts. It is shown that S(0) = S(1). The only way in which S(0) and S(1) could possibly differ is that 
the probability of spot market price R2 is different. R2 only emerges when all suppliers are not produ-
cing, except for the supplier being considered. This probability is µ
N-1 when there are 0 or 1 contracts. 
  The only spot market prices which are candidates for a change in probability weight are R2 and 
R3 when the second contract will be established. The probability of R2 continues to be µ
N-1 because it 
only emerges when both contracts don't produce and only one unit is available in the spot market. R3's  
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probability weight also doesn't change because it doesn't matter from a combinatorial point of view 
whether the contract partner of the buyer with R1, or the buyer with R2, or both don't produce. 
  If the number of contracts becomes larger than two, then the expected payoff of a seller in the 
spot market will increase. The reason is that buyers in contracts with relatively low reservation prices 
may receive a unit when a high reservation price buyer doesn't because his contract partner doesn't 
produce and the available units in the spot market are at such a low level that they are obtained by 
buyers with even higher reservation prices. More probability weight is therefore shifted to higher spot 
market prices when the number of contracts increases beyond two. This will drive up the spot market 
price and, therefore, the expected payoff of a seller in the spot market. A positive relationship emerges 
between the expected payoff of a seller in the spot market and the number of contracts when the number 
of contracts is larger than two. Figure three illustrates theorem 4. 
 
 
Theorem 5:  The expected spot market price decreases as a function of α when α is small 
and positive and increases for sufficiently large values of α, given that the 
market is large enough. 
 
The intuition for the first part is that the formation of the first contract implies that the buyer with the 
reservation price R1 is not in the spot market when his contract partner is producing. The probability that 
# contracting  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 
Si(M) 
Figure 3: The expected payoff of a seller in the spotmarket  
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the spot market price is R2 is therefore reduced. All other spot market prices continue to have the same 
probability weight. The appendix has formalizes this by defining a matrix M(k) in the proof of the 
lemma which characterizes the probability distribution of the spot market price as a function of the 
number of contracts. It is subsequently straightforward to show that 
 
  E{p | k=0} - E{p | k=1} = (M12(0)-M12(1))µ
N-1 (1-µ)R2 = µ
N-1(1-µ) R2 > 0. 
 
The formation of the second contract reinforces this effect. The probability of spot market price R2 is 
further reduced and also the probability of R3 is decreased. All other spot market prices continue to have 
the same probability weight. Formally, 
 
  E{p | k=1} - E{p | k=2} 
 
 =  (M12(1)-M12(2)) µ




 =  µ
N-1(1-µ)R2 + µ
N-2(1-µ)
2R3 > 0. 
 
  The second part of the theorem requires that k and N are sufficiently large. This result can be 
made intuitive by considering the probability that the spot market price is R2. This requires that the 
contract partners of the buyers with R1 and R2 are not delivering. The probability of this event is µ
2. R2 
emerges when exactly one seller is producing in the spot market. The probability of this event depends 
on the size of the spot market. It increases when the spot market becomes smaller. A similar argument 
holds for the probability weight of the other spot market prices.
2 Matrix M(k) has to be used to calculate 
the exact turning point, which depends on the reservation prices R2,...,RN and µ. Figure four provides a 
graphical illustration of theorem 5. 
                                                             
2 Table 1 provides an example in which the market is too small for the emergence of the second part of 




  Three forces drive the result of theorem 5. First, if the extent of contracting increases, then the 
supply of the product on the spot market will be lower on average. This has an increasing effect on the 
expected spot market price. Second, contracting removes the buyers partially out of the spot market. 
Buyers in contracts are only in the spot market when the upstream contract partner does not deliver. This 
has a decreasing effect on the expected spot market price. This second effect dominates when α is 
positive and close to zero (, i.e. the extent of contracting is small), because the high reservation price 
buyers are less often in the market. Theorem 5 has provided the formal argument for why this is strictly 
so when a market with zero contracts is compared with one contract and one contract is compared with 
two contracts. Third, buyers in contracts will be in the spot market when the upstream contract partner 
does not deliver. Additional contracting entails that residual contract demand gains importance in the 
spot market. The increased use of the contracting mode of exchange consists of the buyers with the 
intermediate reservation prices. This implies that the probability of intermediate spot market prices 
decreases, i.e. the relative probability weight of high spot market prices increases. Additional residual 
contract demand increases therefore the expected spot market price. This third effect reverses the 
negative relationship between the spot market price and α, when α is above a certain level. However, 
the value of the parameters β, σ and µ may be such that the market is too small for the first and third 
effect to dominate the second. A numerical example with β = σ = 2 and µ= 0.5 illustrates this market 




Figure 4: The expected spot market price 
# contracting  
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 j    Rj   k    E{p(M,e)}   Var{p(M,e)} 
1 2    0    0.6667    0.2222 
 2   1    1    0.5000    0.2500 
 
Table 1: The impact of contract formation when the market consists of two buyers and two sellers and µ 
= 0.5 
 
  Our probability distribution argument provides an endogenous bound on contracting in an 
industry. Additional contracting increases the expected spot market price and therefore reinforces the 
upperbound. The expected spot market price increases as a function of the extent of contracting because 
the reduction in supply dominates the reduction in spot market demand. However, an increase in α when 
α is either small or large decreases the expected spot market price. The demand effect dominates the 
supply effect when α is small, whereas the probability that at least one unit is available in the spotmarket 
is responsible for a declining expected spot market price when α is large.  
  Notice the difference between theorem 4 (figure three) and 5 (figure four). The focus of theorem 
4 is on a seller, whereas theorem 5 represents the market point of view. The probability distribution of 
the spot market price associated with the first perspective is not the same as the probability distribution 
of the spot market price seen from a market perspective. These probability distributions are only 
identical when the equilibrium consists of N-1 contracts. 
  The expressions of the expectation and the variance turn out to be analytically to cumbersome to 




Theorem  6:  The variance of the spot market price declines, subsequently increases and 
finally decreases as a function of α, given that the market is large enough. 
 
 
  Three forces determine the comparative statics results of an increasing contract benefit 
parameter on the variance: reduction of high reservation price spot market demand, size of the spot 
                                                             
3 The appendix specifies matrices S(k) and M(k) regarding the equilibrium contract prices as a function 
of the extent of contracting and the expected spot market price. They are programmed, where the 
numerical values of µ, R1,...,Rβ and σ are input parameters. Table 1 serves as a first check of the 
numerical analysis.  
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market and reduction of spot market supply. An increase in α from 0 to a positive number induces 
contracting by the high reservation price buyers. They will compete less often in the spot market against 
each other and therefore high spot market prices will occur less frequent; the buyers in the spot market 
become more similar on average. This implies a lower variance of the spot market price. An additional 
increase in the contract benefit parameter will also drive the buyers with intermediate reservation prices 
to the contracting mode of exchange. This additional reduction of the spot market supply restores the 
relative probability weight on high spot market prices; residual contract demand gains importance 
compared to the spot market demand from the non-integrated buyers. Finally, the reduction in the spot 
market supply determines the downward pattern in the variance when the level of the contract benefit 
induces a large extent of contracting. The spot market supply is at such a low level that only the high 
reservation price residual contract demand can be satisfied; buyers actually getting the product are more 
similar on average. Spot market prices will almost always be high, which implies a low variance. 
  Figure five illustrates theorems 5 and 6. Suppose that we have a linear reservation price 
schedule. The curve Dk represents the expected spot market demand, when there are k contracts. If 
p(M,e) > Rk+1, then Dk is a fraction 1-µ of D0. If p(M,e) < Rk+1, then Dk+1 is to the left of Dk because the 
expected spot market demand of the firm with reservation price Rk+1 is 1-µ, whereas it is one when there 
are only k contracts. The expected spot market demand decreases when there are more contracts. This 
has a decreasing effect on the expected spot market price. However, the expected spot market supply 
also decreases. This is represented by the vertical lines Sk and Sk+1. (The expected spot market supply is 
(1-µ)(N-k) when there are k contracts). This has an increasing effect on the expected spot market price. 
If the number of contracts is small, then the first effect dominates. Otherwise the second effect will 
dominate. In terms of figure four, the expected demand to the left of point a is not affected by the 
formation of more than k contracts, whereas the expected supply curve is. If the number of contracts is 
large, then the variance of the spot market price will increase with further contract formation. This is 





  Contracts are often formed in order to reduce the variability of the spot market price. Carlton 
(1979) wrote: "I'm arguing that real costs are associated with operating in a variable market. For 
example, one reason for contracts is that transaction costs of finding buyers on the spot market are 
eliminated by a long-term contract. This transaction cost of finding buyers is likely to depend on the 
variability of the spot price. (More variability implies more likely initial dispersion of prices which in 
turn implies more search)". Although contracts are not formed in our model to decrease price variability, 
it should be noted that theorem 6 would reinforce the coexistence result. The incorporation of the 
variance of the spot market price in the contracting decision implies that α depends on Var{p(M,e)}. 
The observation by Carlton implies that α is positively related to Var{p(M,e)}. The values of α(k), 
k=0,...,N-1 will not change when considerations regarding Var{p(M,e)} play a role in the contracting 
decision. It reinforces the result of theorem 5 that there is an endogenous upperbound on the extent of 
contracting, because the value of α will decrease due to contracting when many market participants have 
already integrated. 
  A numerical example with µ = 0.5 is summarized in table two. The value of the exogenous 








Sk+1  Sk  P(M,e) 
Rk+1 
Rk+2 
Figure 5: The spot market  
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the equilibrium number of contracts k, i.e. there are k contracts when α(k) ≤ α < α(k+1). The column 
with the value of k could therefore be replaced by a column specifying intervals for α, where the 
endpoints are α(k) and α(k+1). 
 
 j    Rj  k   E{p(M,e)}   Var{p(M,e)}   si(j;M) 
 1    13    0   6.4992   3.2452    3.0000 
 2    12    1   6.4985   3.2419    3.0000 
 3    11    2   6.4973   3.2366    3.0000 
 4    10    3   6.4963   3.2402    3.0001 
 5   9    4   6.5022   3.3094    3.0017 
 6   8    5   6.5377   3.5819    3.0114 
 7   7    6   6.6507   4.2246    3.0479 
 8   6    7   6.9034   5.2356    3.1448 
 9   5    8   7.3373   6.2593    3.3384 
  10   4    9   7.9387   6.7292    3.6448 
  11   3   10   8.6390   6.3253    4.0479 
  12   2   11   9.3506   5.2348    4.5114 
 13    1    12   10.0034    3.9267    5.0017 
 
  Table 2: A numerical example 
 
  Some comparative statics results regarding µ are straightforward and not explicitly stated in the 
form of theorems. First, the extent of contracting at which the variance of the spot market price attains 
its maximum declines when µ is increased. Notice that it is not claimed that the maximum is reached at 
µ = .5. This might seem strange because the (stochastic) event that a seller has a unit for sale has a 
variance of µ(1-µ). However, the variance of the spot market price consists of two parts: an endogenous 
and an exogenous component. The exogenous uncertainty is captured by the probability that a seller has 
a unit for sale. The variance of this stochastic variable is µ(1-µ) for each seller. The effect of the 
endogenous component is described in theorem 6. A larger value of µ implies that the buyer in a 
contract will be more often in the spot market and will outbid the permanent spot market buyers. This 
reduces the variance of the spot market price. A smaller extent of contracting will increase the 
variability of the spot market price. Second, if µ increases, then E{p(M,e)} increases. The buyers with 
the highest reservation prices are the only ones to get a unit on the spot market, given that the spot  
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market supply is low. If the probability of not having a unit for sale increases for every seller, then there 
is on average less for sale on the spot market. This tilts the distribution of buyer valuations in the spot 
market towards higher values in equilibrium and therefore a higher expected spot market price. Third, an 
increase in µ reduces the extent of contracting at which the minimum of E{p(M,e)} is attained. The 
initial decrease in the expected spot market price when α is small and increased is due to the buyers with 
high reservation prices being removed partially from the spot market. An increase in µ has a stronger 
reverse effect on the expected spot market price because spot market supply will be lower and residual 
contract demand will be higher on average. Table 2 shows that the lowest expected spot market price for 
µ = .5 emerges (in figure 4) when the number of contracts is three. This minimum is reached at k = 2 
when µ = .75 and at k = 4 when µ = .1. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
  
  Contracting is explained by differences in the reservation prices of buyers, production 
uncertainty regarding sellers and a difference in cost between contract exchange and spot market 
exchange. Firms choose the contracting mode of exchange because it is able to capture certain benefits 
that can't be absorbed when exchange is done in the spot market. The formation and extent of contracts 
and the distribution of the contract benefit between the buyer and the seller is disciplined by the 
opportunities facing each contract participant in the spot market. The buyers with the relatively high 
reservation prices will have contracts because they are able to compensate the seller for not being in the 
spot market. The role of the spot market is to provide buyers in contracts with an additional opportunity 
to satisfy their unfulfilled contract demand. The role of the buyers with the low reservation price is to 
support the existence of the spot market. These buyers are able to survive because it is sufficient for 
them to get the product only once in a while. Sellers in the spot market earn the same profits as their 
counterparts in contracts because they have the opportunity of making an exchange with a high 
reservation price buyer, once in a while. The comparative statics reinforced the result that there is an 
upper bound on the number of contracts that can be formed. The expected payoff of a seller does not 
decrease with contracting (theorem 4), but this is not true for the expected spot market price (theorem 5) 
since contracting changes which trades occur and changes the probability with which the spot market 
opens. 
  There are several extensions of the above analysis possible. All sellers are taken to be identical. 
Our qualitative results are not influenced by relaxing this assumption. However, the combinatorial 
difficulties associated with the calculation of the expected spot market price and the expected payoff of 
the market participants increase considerably. A similar remark holds for a relaxing the assumption that  
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sellers in contracts are not allowed to trade on the spot market. Qualitative results are robust with respect 
to this specification, because the contract benefit essentially would prevent ex post that buyers with 
higher valuation obtain the product. A more fundamental extension would be an investigation into 
whether contracting is an optimal mode of exchange. There is for example no distinction between 
vertical integration or exchange via contracts (Aghion and Bolton, 1987). The specification of a detailed 
information structure or the bounded rationality of the players becomes important in order to analyse the 
rationale for different types of contracts. Vertical integration may change the incentive structure of the 
integrating parties in a different way than contracts do. The parameter α will be derived endogenously in 
such a framework. This is important but goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, we expect that 
our qualitative results regarding market structure continue to hold within more complex economic 
environments. 
  Another avenue for research concerns empirical analyses. The introduction section has shown 
that coexistence is a widespread phenomenon. An attractive feature of our model is that it requires only 
(the estimation of) a limited number of parameters (β, σ, µ and α) and is robust with respect to the 
reservation prices of buyers and sellers. Case studies may also shed some light on the relevance of the 
approach taken in this article. An example is the oil tanker market. The case studies by Porter (1980) and 
Frankel et al. (1985) seem to support certain aspects of the above model. Porter observed: "The main 
participants in the oil tanker industry were the oil companies, the independent ship owners, shipping 
brokers, and the shipbuilding industry. These players were remarkably different in their approaches to 
doing business." Oil companies can be thought of as the high reservation price buyers in our model. 
They use continuous process operations, which are difficult as well as extremely costly to shut down. 
However, they don't rely completely on their own fleet ("To supplement their internal tanker fleets, oil 
companies utilized both chartered and spot vessels"). The description of the independent ship owners is 
also not at odds with our model. Porter writes: "Ship owners had a number of options in running their 
fleets, ranging from operating all ships under long-term charter agreements to running an entire fleet on 
the spot market. At any given time approximately sixty percent of the independently owned fleet was on 
term charter." and "The Greeks generally followed a policy of seeking time charters on their newer, 
larger vessels. They placed only their older, usually smaller vessels on the spot market." Despite these 
observations, more empirical research is needed to determine whether coexistence in these markets 
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  This appendix provides the proofs of the lemma and theorem 4. We will use β = σ = N in order 
to simplify the formulation of the proofs. 
 
Proof of the lemma 
 
 Buyer  Rk faces a different probability distribution of the spot market price in the situation with a 
contract partner not delivering than in the situation without a contract. Define gk as the expected payoff 
of buyer Rk when his contract partner is not delivering and hk as the expected payoff of buyer Rk without 
a contract, given that buyers R1,...,Rk-1 have contracts. The reservation contract price ck(k-1) of buyer Rk 
when the buyers R1,...,Rk-1 have contracts is determined by 
 
   (1-µ)(Rk+α) + µgk - ck(k-1) = hk 
 
  ⇔ Rk + α - ck(k-1)/(1-µ) = (hk-µgk)/(1-µ). 
 
 Expressions  gk and hk are determined by the probability distribution of the spot market price. 
Define a (N+1,N+1)-matrix M(k) such that the probability distribution of the spot market price when 




























































































where ‘-‘ denotes that there are zero units available in the spot market. The sum of the elements of a 
particular column of M(k) is again independent of k. 
 If  k=0,  thenM
N
j







⎠ ⎟ =+  All other elements of M(0) are zero. The formation 
of the first contract increases the probability that the spot market doesn't exist, i.e. no units are produced 
by suppliers without contracts. Fewer supplier in the spot market is responsible for this result. Some of  
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the probability weight is shifted from R2 to the event that the spot market doesn't exist. All other 
elements of M(1) are the same as in M(0). The formation of the k-th contract involves Mjj(k) - Mjj(k-
1) < 0 and Mij(k) - Mij(k-1) > 0 for j = 2(1)K+1. The combinatorial difference Mjj(k-1) - Mjj(k) shifts 
completely to the event that the spot market doesn't exist when Mjj(k-1) - Mjj(k) = M1j(k) - M1j(k-1). 
Otherwise, the difference Mjj(k-1) - Mjj(k) - (M1j(k) - M1j(k-1) is distributed over Mij(k), where 2 ≤ i ≤ j-
1. The probability that the spot market doesn't exist is µ
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1 () . The remaining part of the construction is identical to the one of S(k). This 
























































































This completes the description of M(k). 
  The size (N+1,N+1) of matrix M(k) has thus far been suppressed in order to simplify the 
notation. It turns out that this size is important in determining (hk-µgk)/(1-µ) and will therefore be made 
explicit by using the notation M
N+1(k) and Pr (.) k
N+1  in the remaining part of this proof. The 
combinatorial features of hk are completely described by M
N+1(k-1). The definition of gk implies that 
spot market price 0 will not occur due to the non-delivery of the contract partner of buyer k. Only N-1 
sellers determine the probability weight of the spot market price in the expression of gk, where the 
combinatorial aspects of the probability weight are described by M
N(k-1). 
  The combinatorial aspects of the probabilities of the spot market prices in (hk-µgk)/(1-µ) are 
summarized in a (N,N) - matrix D
N(k). Observe that the weight attached to the event that no units are 
supplied in the spot market in the expression of hk and µgk is the same. The difference hk - µgk has to be 





























































































The elements of D
N(k) are formally captured by 
 
 k  =  1,2  D
N(k) = M
N(0) 
 k  ≥ 3    Dk
Mk Mk i j N































We have therefore that 
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where RN+1 ≡ 0. Notice that ck(k-1) is negatively related to the value of k. 
  Define c(k) as the expected payoff of a seller having a unit available in the spot market when 
there are k contracts. The definition of α(k) entails that buyer Rk can just afford a contract, i.e. the 
reservation contract price ck(k-1) is equal to c(k). Using the expression of ck(k-1) results in 













. ) ( Pr ) ( Pr ) 1 /( ) ( ) ( µ α  
Theorem 2 states that c(1) = c(2) and that c(k) is an increasing function in k for k ≥ 3. Similarly, it has 
been shown in this proof that (h1-µg1)/(1-µ) = (h2-µg2)/(1-µ) and that (hk-µgk)/(1-µ) is a decreasing 
function in k for k ≥ 3. It follows immediately from these observations that and α(k) is an increasing 
function in k. Finally, it is straightforward to calculate that α(1) = α(2)  =  0 by using the above 




Proof of theorem 4 
 
Define a (N,N)-matrix S(k) such that the probability distribution of the spot market price faced from the 



























































































  The number on the i-th row and j-th column of S(k) is defined to be Sij(k). It is equal to the 
number of possibilities in which j-1 units can be produced by the other N-1 suppliers and generates a 
spot market price Ri+1 when the buyers j with Rj ≥ Rk use the contracting mode of exchange. Notice that 
the sum of the elements of a particular column j of S(k) reflects the number of ways in which j-1 units 
can be produced by N-1 suppliers. It does not depend on k. It will be shown how this number is 
distributed over R2,...,Rj as a function of the number of contracts. This depends on k because the 
identities of the firms in contracts having to buy in the spot market matter for the level of the spot 
market price. 
  The determination of S(k) will be done first for the case k=0. If there are no contracts, then the 
spot market price is completely determined by the number of units which are produced. It does not 
matter which sellers are producing. The probability that the spot market price is Ri, 
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12 1 2 µµ () ( ) . All off-diagonal elements are therefore zero, 
whereas the diagonal elements are S
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⎠ ⎟ = . 
  S(k) is computed from the viewpoint of a seller in the spot market having a unit available. This 
perspective is responsible for the claim that S(2) = S(1) = S(0). The buyer with R1 is in the first contract. 
S(1) is always identical to S(0), because the buyer with R1 will always get a unit when there is one 
available in either the spot market or the contract. The number of combinations at which a particular 
spot market price emerges doesn't change. If there are two contracts, then the only way that R2 emerges 
as spot market price is that everybody else is broken down. R3 clears the market when one other unit is 
available. The number of combinations at which this is realized does not depend on whether this one 
unit is produced in the spot market or in a contract.  
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  S(k) changes with the formation of the third contract. The spot market price is not only 
determined by the number of units which are produced, but also by which sellers in contracts are not 
delivering. Suppose that only the supplier of the third contract is producing and nobody else, except for 
the particular supplier in the spot market we are considering. The market clearing price will be R2. The 
spot market price would be R3 when there are less than three contracts, because there are two units 
available in the spot market. So, some of the probability weight of R3 is shifted to R2. All other elements 
of S(3) are the same as in S(2). 
  The probability weight of R2 continues to increase when the number of contracts is further 
expanded. It is equal to the probability that the first two contracts don't produce and only the seller we 
are considering in the spot market is producing. If there are k contracts, then this probability is equal to 
µ
2 times µ


















ll ( ) .This determines the first k-
1 elements of the first row of S(k). All other elements of the first row are zero. A similar combinatorial 
procedure is used for the determination of all other rows of S(k). The only difference is that the 
(combinatorial) numbers of a particular row have to be multiplied by the diagonal numbers of this row. 
This accounts for the number of combinations which result in this market clearing price. This number is 
already obtained in the calculation of the previous rows because the numbers of a particular column add 
up to a number which is independent of the number of contracts. 
  This procedure is formally captured by 























































































































This completes the description of S(k). The equilibrium expected payoff of a seller in the spot market 











The proof is completed by observing that Prsk+1(Ri) - Prsk(Ri) = 0 for every k=1,2 and i ∈ {2,...,N} and 
Prsk+1(Ri) - Prsk(Ri) ≥ 0 for every k ≥ 3 and i ∈ {2,...,N}. 
 